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Abstract
This paper presents a strategic growth model that analyzes the impact
of endogenous preferences on equilibrium dynamics by employing the tools
provided by lattice theory and supermodular games. Supermodular game
structure of the model let us provide monotonicity results on the great-
est and the least equilibrium without making any assumptions regarding
the curvature of the production function. We also sharpen these results
by showing the diﬀerentiability of the value function and the uniqueness
of the best response correspondence almost everywhere. We show that,
unlike globally monotone capital sequences obtained under correspond-
ing optimal growth models, a non-monotonic capital sequence can be ob-
tained. We conclude that the rich can help the poor avoid poverty trap
whereas even under convex technology, the poor may theoretically push
the rich to her lower steady state.
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1 Introduction
The classical optimal growth models focus on the convex structures of the tech-
nology and preferences that guarantee the monotonical convergence of the se-
quence of optimal stocks towards a unique steady state. Such a structure imply
that convergence is assured under perfect competition, constant or diminishing
returns with no external eﬀects and the same constant discount rate, indepen-
dent of initial conditions. However, growth is uneven among countries (see
Quah, 1996; Barro, 1997; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1991), regional disparities
are persistent and income inequality is severe among the individuals.
To account for non-convergent growth paths among countries and regions,
a variety of one-sector optimal growth models that incorporate some degree of
market imperfections based on technological external eﬀects and increasing re-
turns have been presented. Within a model of capital accumulation with convex-
concave production function, Dechert and Nishimura (1983), Mitra and Ray
(1984) have characterized optimal paths and prove the existence of threshold
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1eﬀect that generates development or poverty traps (see Azariadis and Stachurski,
2005, for a recent survey). In these models, an economy with low initial capital
stock converge to a steady state with low per capita income, while an economy
with high initial capital stock converge to a steady state with high per capita
income.
On the preference side, the endogeneity of time preference is put forward to
show the economies’ dependence on initial endowments. While Mantel (1998)
consider discount factor as a function of consumption, Stern (2006), along the
lines of Becker and Mulligan (1997), let individuals spend resources to increase
the appreciation of the future. Le Van et. al. (2009) adapt the classic optimal
growth model to include an endogenous rate of time preference depending on
the stock of capital. Under these various forms of endogenous discounting,
multiplicity of steady states and conditionally sustained growth are shown.
Although initial conditions are important for growth, poverty should not be
a curse. Indeed, overcoming regional disparities in per-capita income is a mat-
ter of major concern for the governments. Cohesion policies targeting regional
disparities aim to connect economically the rich regions with the other regions,
so that the laggard regions may beneﬁt from and contribute to the overall eco-
nomic performance. For example, when the Portugal and Spain joined the EU
in 1986, their GDP per capita was - on a purchasing power basis - at 53 % and 70
% of EU average, respectively. In 2008, their GDP per capita - on a purchasing
power basis - attained 70% and 90% of the EU-15, (see Eurostat ﬁgures, 2009).
Provided their history and political transition period, it is obvious that both
countries would have grown out of the EU frame. However, EU membership
has fostered their growth through various channels including transfers. During
the 1994-1999, the structural and cohesion funds amounted 3.3 % of Portuguese
GDP and 1.5 % of Spanish GDP. The percentage of public investment ﬁnanced
by EU funds reached average values of 42 % in Portugal and 15 % in Spain
(Royo and Manuel, 2003).
In order to overcome regional disparities substantial ﬁscal transfers ﬂow from
relatively rich regions to relatively poor ones. It has been estimated that around
1.3 trillion euros have been transferred to the East after the German reuniﬁca-
tion (Barrell and Velde, 2000). Due to this eﬀort living standards in the East
have risen with GDP per capita attaining 70% of western Germans, however
there still exists a gap between East and West. Taking into account that 4%
of German GDP is annually consumed by the costs of reuniﬁcation, the lack of
economic blossoming in the East could prevent Germany, and West Germany
in particular, from attaining a higher growth trajectory path. Financial trans-
fers to the Mezzogiorno, southern part of Italy, are another example where the
burden is put on the large agent in size. There are funds ﬂowing to the South
in the form of national health service, unemployment insurance and public ex-
penditures from the central government (Faini et al., 1993). Moreover, Alesina
et. al. (1999) shows the use of public employment as a subsidy from the North
to the less wealthy South.
On the other hand, richer region would be small in size and may contribute
relatively too much to the common goal, deterring its own growth. Catalonia
suﬀers a slow but persistent drop in GDP, attaining its historical minimum
within Spain in 2001, 18.6 % of national GDP (Pons-i-Novell and Tremosa-i-
Balcells, 2005). Although one can ﬁnd many reasons that could explain this
slowdown, one can not deny the role of the ﬁscal deﬁcit amounted to 8.9 % of
2Catalan GDP (Alcaide and Alcaide, 2002) in the slowdown process. Indeed,
according to Ros et. al. (2003), Catalan GDP would have been a 31.3 % bigger
in 2000 if the Catalan ﬁscal deﬁcit had been reinvested in public capital in
Catalonia.
Reducing regional disparities is a more serious concern for developing coun-
tries, where these disparities are two to six times more than in the developed
countries (Shankar and Shah, 2003, 2008). In such countries inequalities be-
yond a threshold may pose a threat to the economic and political stability of
the country. The poorest regions may consider such inequalities as manifestation
of regional injustice and call for radicalism and drastic redistribution policies.
On the other hand, the richest regions may view a union with the poorest re-
gions as a threat to their prosperity in the long run (Shankar and Shah, 2009).
For example, in India, a threat to its territorial integrity comes from the rich
south who no longer wants to subsidize poor regions of the North.
While the convergence literature focuses on sources and remedies of diﬀer-
ences in factor productivity, the interaction among heterogeneous agents and
the consequences of such an interaction has been left unexplored. The exam-
ples above, particularly the examples on developed countries suggest that the
outcomes of the cohesion policies may not be attributable solely to the factor
productivity diﬀerences. It is the purpose of this paper to analyze the impact of
endogenous preferences on equilibrium dynamics in a strategic growth model.
We make our analysis while abstracting from any source of factor productivity
diﬀerences for both simplicity and being able to distinguish the consequences of
strategic interaction and endogeneity of time preference from the factors domi-
nating convergence literature.
In line with the empirical studies concluding that the rich are more patient
than the poor (see Lawrence, 1991; Samwick, 1998) and in parallel to the idea
that the stock of wealth is a key to reach better health services and better
insurance markets, we consider that the discount factor is increasing in the stock
of wealth. In such a model, consumption proﬁles of the agents depend on each
other and agents set their consumption strategies considering the strategies of
the others. We introduce heterogeneity by letting two agents diﬀer in their initial
endowment, their share of aggregate income, and therefore in their subjective
discount rates. We analyze whether an agent with a low initial capital stock
can avoid poverty trap that she would face while acting alone. Moreover, we
analyze the implications of an interaction among agents on the relatively richer
one, particularly focusing on if the agent with a low initial capital stock can
pull the rich to her lower steady state that she would never face while acting by
herself.
In a standard optimal growth model with geometric discounting and the
usual convexity assumptions on preferences and technology, the optimal path is
easily found by diﬀerentiating the value function. However, in our model, the
objective function includes multiplication of a discount function. This gener-
ally destroys the usual concavity argument which is used in the proof of the
diﬀerentiability of value function and the uniqueness of the optimal paths (see
Benveniste and Scheinkman, 1979; Araujo, 1991). Since we can not use classical
convex analysis under the potential lack of concavity and the diﬀerentiability of
the value functions, we employ the theory of monotone comparative statics and
supermodular games based on order and monotonicity properties on lattices.
The framework of analysis to study supermodular games has been developed
3by Topkis (1968, 1978, 1979), Vives (1990), Milgrom and Roberts (1990) and
provided comprehensively by Topkis(1998). By allowing very general strategy
spaces, supermodular games provide a rich structure to be utilized in the analysis
of many diverse models including dynamic games.
We establish the supermodular game structure of our model by showing
that actions of the agents are strategic complements so that the best response
correspondence of a player to the actions of rivals is increasing in their level.
Supermodular game structure of the model let us provide existence and mono-
tonicity results on the greatest and the least equilibrium. We sharpen these
results by showing the diﬀerentiability of the value function and the uniqueness
of the best response correspondence almost everywhere, following from Amir
(1996) and Le Van and Dana (2003). Our approach also allows us to provide
our results without imposing any assumption on the form of technology.
We show that agents may diﬀer in their capital accumulation decisions.
While one of the agents may accumulate, the other agent may deaccumulate
the capital stock at the ﬁrst period. After the ﬁrst period, they both either
accumulate or deaccumulate through the entire duration of the game. This al-
lows us to obtain a non-monotonic capital sequence in contrast with globally
monotone capital sequences obtained under the corresponding optimal growth
model (Le Van et. al., 2009). While abstracting from the curvature of the tech-
nology, we provide that the interaction between the rich and the poor may help
the poor avoid poverty traps that she would face while acting alone whereas the
poor can theoretically push the rich to her lower steady state even under convex
technology.
The article is organized as follows. The next section introduces the model.
Tools needed while utilizing the supermodularity of the game; equilibrium dy-
namics and the steady state analysis have been discussed in Section 3. Finally,
the Section 4 concludes.
2 Model
We consider an intertemporal one sector model of a private ownership econ-
omy a la Arrow-Debreu with a single good xt, and two inﬁnitely lived agents
(households), i = 1,2.
The single commodity is used as capital, along with labor, to produce output.
Labor is presumed to be supplied in ﬁxed amounts, and capital and consumption
are interpreted in per-capita terms. The production function net of depreciation
is given by f (xt). We assume that each agent receives a constant share, θi of the
output (see Debreu, 1959). The amount of current resources not consumed by
an agent is saved as capital until the next period. Given the optimal decisions





t≥0 so as to
maximize a discounted sum of instantaneous utilities. The real valued function
u gives the instantaneous utility from consumption.
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where j 6= i ∈ {1,2} and the real valued function β(xi
s) is the level of discount
on future utility. Agents may only diﬀer in their initial endowment, their share
of output, and therefore in their subjective discount rates.
We make the following assumptions regarding the properties of the discount,
utility and the production functions.
Assumption 1 u : R+ → R+ is continuous, concave, strictly increasing, u0(0) =
+∞ and u(0) = 0.
Assumption 2 β : R+ → R++ is continuous, concave, strictly increasing and
β0(0) = +∞.
Assumption 3 f : R+ → R+ is continuous, strictly increasing and there exists
an
−





< 1 and f (x) < x whenever x >
−
x.
On the contrary to the standard optimal growth models, we assume that the
rate of time preference is endogenous depending on the path of investment. Our
assumption that β is strictly increasing in own capital implies a wealth eﬀect
in discounting. The assumption that engaging in some activity or sacriﬁcing
may alter the discount factor each period has been widely considered in a single
decision maker problem (see Hamada and Takeda, 2008, for a recent survey).
It has been shown that low levels of initial capital leads to a poverty trap
so that paths of deaccumulation would be optimal. However, the impact of
recursive preferences in the case of strategic growth games have been left almost
unexplored. It is the purpose of this paper to ﬁll this gap in the literature and
analyze the consequences of recursive preferences on equilibrium dynamics in
this discrete time dynamic game.
2.1 Non-cooperative diﬀerence game and equilibrium strate-
gies
We adopt the noncooperative Nash equilibrium concept, in which case the strat-
egy choice is simultaneous and each agent is faced with a single criterion op-
timization problem with the strategies of the rival taken to be ﬁxed at their
equilibrium values. This amounts to characterizing the optimal decisions of
each player conditional on the decisions of the rival.
Noting that the constraints will be binding at the optimum as utility and
the discount function is strictly increasing, we introduce the function Ui deﬁned

















The following proposition ensures that, if an agent has an initial positive cap-
ital stock, independent of the rivals’ choices, he will have a positive consumption
and investment path through his trajectory.
5Proposition 1 (i) Given xi
0 and xj, there exists an optimal path xi. The as-








0 > 0, every solution (xi,ci) to the problem of agent i satisﬁes
ci
t > 0, xi
t > 0,∀t.
Proof. See Appendix.
2.2 Bellman Equation and Best Response Correspondance
As the recursive structure of the standard optimal growth models is preserved by
our model, in order to express the optimal decisions of each player conditional on
the decisions of the rival, we will utilize the value function and the best response
correspondance. Each agent i deﬁnes the value function as the solution to his
dynamic optimization problem given the initial state and the decisions of his
rival j, with j 6= i,
V i(xi




















V i is well deﬁned, non-negative, continuous and strictly increasing. The
satisfaction of Bellman’s equation is also straightforward (see Stokey and Lucas,







































The non-emptiness and the closedness of the best response correspondence
and its equivalance with the optimal path follow easily from the continuity of
the value function by a standard application of the theorem of the maximum
(see Stern, 2006 and Le Van and Dana, 2003). Accordingly, if the game admits
an equilibrium then the optimal choices of agent i will be prescribed by the
solution V i  
xi
0 | xj
of the functional equation (4).
In accordance with these, a sequence xi is the maximizing control strategy
of agent i if it satisﬁes














In a standard optimal growth model with geometric discounting and the usual
concavity assumptions on preferences and technology, the optimal policy corre-
spondence, µ is single valued and the properties of the optimal path is easily
found by using the ﬁrst order conditions together with envelope theorem by
diﬀerentiating the value function. However, in our model, the objective func-
tion includes multiplication of a discount function. This generally destroys the
usual concavity argument which is used in the proof of the diﬀerentiability of
value function and the uniqueness of the optimal paths (see Benveniste and
Scheinkman, 1979; Araujo, 1991).
63 Dynamic Properties of Strategic Equilibria
In order to prove existence of equilibrium and characterize the qualitative prop-
erties of the agents’ optimal choices, we will employ lattice programming and
Topkis’ theorems on supermodular games (see Topkis, 1998) as we need to
surmount the potential lack of concavity and the diﬀerentiability of the value
functions. The following section outlines the properties of the supermodular
games we will use in our analysis.
3.1 Supermodular Games and Topkis’ Theorem
Deﬁnition 1 A non-cooperative game (N,S,{fi : i ∈ N}) is a supermod-
ular game if the set S of feasible joint strategies is a sublattice of Rm (or of Q
i∈N Rmi), the payoﬀ function fi(yi,x−i) is supermodular in yi on Si for
each x−i in S−i and each player i, and fi(yi,x−i) has increasing diﬀerences
in (yi,x−i) on Si × S−i for each i.
Under some regularity conditions, the following therom implies that the set
of equilibrium points for a supermodular game is a nonempty complete lattice.
Theorem 1 (Topkis, 1998) Consider a supermodular game (N,S,{fi : i ∈ N})
for which the set S of feasible joint strategies is nonempty and compact and the
payoﬀ function fi(yi,x−i) is upper semicontinuous in yi on Si(x−i) for each x−i
in S−i and i, then the set of equilibrium points is a nonempty complete lattice
and a greatest and a least equilibrium point exist.
We refer to two theorems while obtaining the results on equilibrium points.
The ﬁrst one gives us suﬃcient conditions on a parameterized collection of su-
permodular games such that the greatest and the least equilibrium points for
the game corresponding to each particular parameter increase as the parame-
ter increases. The second one gives us suﬃcient conditions for an optimization
problem to obtain a stronger result ensuring that the best response correspon-
dance of an agent in its initial capital is increasing. This fact will be crucial
in proving the uniqueness of the equilibrium point where the greatest and the
least equilibrium points coincide.
Theorem 2 Let St
i(x−i) denote the set of feasible strategies for player i given
strategies x−i for the other players and S−i = {x−i : Si(x−i) is nonempty}.
Suppose that T is a partially ordered set and (N,St,{ft
i : i ∈ N}) is a collection
of supermodular games parameterized by t in T where in game t, the payoﬀ
function for each player i is ft
i(x) and the set of feasible joint strategies is St.
The set St of feasible joint strategies is nonempty and compact for each t in T
and is increasing in t on T. Let St
−i and St
i(x−i) denote the dependence of S−i
and Si(x−i) on the parameter t. For each player i and each x−i in St
−i, the
payoﬀ function ft
i(yi,x−i) is upper semicontinuous in yi on St
i(x−i) for each t
in T and has increasing diﬀerences in (yi,t) on (∪t∈TSt
i)×T. Then there exists
a greatest equilibrium point and a least equilibrium point for each game t in T,
and the greatest (least) equilibrium point for game t is incresing in t on T.
Theorem 3 Suppose that X is a lattice, T is a partially ordered set, St is a
subset of X for each t in T, St is increasing in t on T, f(x,t) is supermodular
7in x on X for each t in T, and f(x,t) has strictly increasing diﬀerences in (x,t)
on X × T. If t0 and t00 are in T, t0 < t00, x0 is in argmaxx∈St0f(x,t) and x00 is
in argmaxx∈St00f(x,t), then x0  x00.
3.2 Equilibrium Dynamics
In this section, supermodularity of our strategic growth game will be established.
Then by using this property, existence and monotonicity proofs for the extreme
equilibrium points will be shown. Although these proofs are straightforward
applications of the theorems above, since they are important to see how the
supermodular game structure can be utilized in the analysis of dynamic games,
they are provided in detail at the appendix.











denotes the set of feasible strategies for agent i at each























t) agent i receives an utility measured













where yj = x
j
t+1 ∈ xj.




j) : i ∈
N}) is a supermodular game.
Proof. See Appendix.
For each feasible joint strategy z in S(x
i,x
j), the best joint response corre-
spondence, µ(x | z ∈ x) is deﬁned as the direct product of the individual agents’
best response correspondances:






























, where zj = x
j
t+1 ∈ xj
and zi = xi
t+1 ∈ xi.




j) : i ∈ N}) has the
set of equilibrium points which is a nonempty complete lattice and a greatest
and a least equilibrium points exist.
Proof. See Appendix.
The existence of equilibria in this class of inﬁnite action dynamic games with
imperfect information also follows from Chakrabarti (1999). Given a discrete
time dynamic game, it is shown that one can ﬁnd a ﬁnite action game such that
every behavior strategy combination of the ﬁnite action game can be mimicked
by a behavior strategy combination of the original inﬁnite action game in the
sense that the resulting payoﬀs from the behavior strategies cannot diﬀer by
more than the small amount . Moreover, for every strategy combination on a
8subgame of the original game, it is proven that one can ﬁnd a behavior strategy
of the ﬁnite action game which will give payoﬀs that can not diﬀer by more than
 on the subgames.
Accordingly, in our context, as the instantaneous utility functions are con-
tinuous and the individual consumption sets are compact sets that depend con-
tinuously on the choices made previously, the particular game that we have
described above has −perfect equilibria (see Chakrabarti, 1999). Such an
−perfect equilibria can incorporate most of the characteristics of the perfect
equilibrium which was used to construct it. Indeed, considering the limits of se-
quences of outcomes induced by −perfect equilibria, with  converging to zero,
one can demonstrate that the game admits a subgame perfect equilibrium1.
Proposition 4 Let X = {
 
xi,xj


























ii) The greatest (least) equilibrium point for the game (N,Sx,{P(x| x




is increasing in x on ˆ X.
Proof. See Appendix.
Next, we provide diﬀerentiability of the value function. It will not only help
us obtain the Euler conditions easily, but also sharpen the results we get. Since
almost everywhere diﬀerentiability of the value function is equivalent to almost
everywhere uniqueness of the best response correspondance, all the results we
get for the extreme equilibrium points hold for the unique equilibrium.
Lemma 1 V i is diﬀerentiable almost everywhere with




where µi(xi | xj) is the best response correspondance of agent i.
Proof. See Appendix.
Now, by using the diﬀerentiability of value function, we could obtain the
Euler equation.
Lemma 2 ∀x ∈ [0,max(x0, ¯ x)], µ(·) satisﬁes the Euler equation:

















Proof. We take the ﬁrst order derivative of 4 and equate this derivative to zero
to obtain the Euler equation.
The next result is important to see the possibility of non-monotonic capital
sequence in which while one agent accumulates, the other one deaccumulates
capital stock at the ﬁrst period of the game. After the ﬁrst period, equilibrium
dynamics are characterized by the total capital stock.
1See Harris (1985), Hellwig and Leininger (1987) and Carmona (2003) for the existence
of subgame perfect equilibrium in dynamic games with perfect information. Note that the
assumption of perfect information rules out the possibility that agents make simultaneous
choices. However, this assumption was used only to show the non-emptiness of a correspon-
dence that speciﬁes a set of outcome paths feasible in any subgame in Harris (1985) and can
be dropped by imposing supplementary conditions which guarantee this step.
9Proposition 5 Either both agents accumulate or both agents deaccumulate af-














































1, by the monotonicity






2. By the same



















1, by the monotonicity

















































































t+1 for all t ≥ 1.
Remark 1 None of the results we get in this section, particularly diﬀerentia-
bility of value function and monotone dynamics of capital, require the concavity
of production function.
3.3 Steady States














set. Euler equation provides us the following necessary conditions for the chara-
terization of the steady states:
u0[θf(xi + xj) − xi] = β0(xi)
u[θf(xi + xj) − xi]
1 − β(xi)
+ θβ(xi)u0(θf(xi + xj) − xi)f0(xi + xj),
and
u0[(1 − θ)f(xi + xj) − xj] = β0(xj)
u[(1 − θ)f(xi + xj) − xj]
1 − β(xj)
+
(1 − θ)β(xi)u0((1 − θ)f(xi + xj) − xj)f0(xi + xj).
Proposition 6 Steady states are linearly ordered. That is, for each pair of
distinct steady states, ˆ x = (ˆ xi, ˆ xj) and ˇ x = (ˇ xi, ˇ xj), either ˆ x > ˇ x or ˆ x < ˇ x.
Proof. For a pair of distinct steady states, we have either ˆ xi + ˆ xj = ˇ xi + ˇ xj or
ˆ xi + ˆ xj 6= ˇ xi + ˇ xj. Let us assume that they are not linearly ordered. Figure 1
illustrates these cases diagramatically.
Case 1: ˆ xi+ˆ xj = ˇ xi+ˇ xj. Let0s take xn = (ˆ xi+ 1
n, ˆ xj), then xn
i +xn
j > ˆ xi+ˆ xj
and xn
i + xn
j > ˇ xi + ˇ xj. ∀ n such that x0 = xn, we can conclude x1 ≥ ˇ x and
10Figure 1: Possible cases if steady states were not linearly ordered
x1 ≥ ˆ x. Hence x1 ∈ A ∩ B where A = {x | x ≥ ˆ x} and B = {x | x ≥ ˇ x}. By
construction, limn→∞ xn = ˆ x. But, for x0 = ˆ x, x1 = x0 = ˆ x / ∈ A ∩ B yields a
contradiction since best response correspondance is right continuous.
Case 2: ˆ xi + ˆ xj 6= ˇ xi + ˇ xj. Without loss of any generality, suppose that




2 ). There exists ε such that, for
∀ x  Bε(˜ xi, ˜ xj), we have ˆ xi+ˆ xj > ˜ xi+˜ xj > ˇ xi+ˇ xj. Since ˆ x is a steady state, for
x0 = ˆ x, we have x1 = ˆ x. By letting x0 = x, we obtain x1 ≤ ˆ x. In the same way,
we can show x1 ≥ ˇ x. By almost everywhere uniqueness of the best response
correspondances, for some x0 = x, x1 ∈ A ∩ B where A = {x | x ≤ ˆ x} and
B = {x | x ≥ ˜ x}. Since A∩B = ∅, this contradicts the existence of equilibrium
points.
Propositions 4 and 5 provide us a way to specify the steady states where
capital stock may converge. The next proposition shows that if the initial total
capital stock is less than the total capital at the lowest steady state, both agents
will accumulate after the ﬁrst period until capital stock converges to this steady
state. Similarly, if the initial total capital stock is more than what we have at
the highest steady state, both agents will deaccumulate after the ﬁrst period
until capital stock converges there. For all other cases, capital stock converges
either to the highest among stable steady states in which total capital stock is
lower than the initial total capital stock or to the lowest among stable steady
states in which total capital stock is higher than the initial total capital stock.
Moreover, as long as one agent accumulates more than the amount that the
other agent deaccumulates, capital stock will converge to the higher of those
through a sustained accumulation path.
Proposition 7 Let ˆ x denote the lowest among stable steady states where total
capital stock is higher than the initial total capital stock and ˇ x denote highest
among stable steady states where total capital stock is lower than the initial total
capital stock, if they exist. Additionally, let xt,x
− and
−
x denote capital stock at








j then limt→∞ xt = x
− and xt ≤ x












then limt→∞ xt =
−
x and xt ≥
−
x for all t ≥ 1.
(c) If ˆ xi + ˆ xj ≥ xi
0 + x
j
0 ≥ ˇ xi + ˇ xj then either limt→∞ xt = ˇ x and xt ≥ ˇ x
for all t ≥ 1 or limt→∞ xt = ˆ x and xt ≤ ˆ x for all t ≥ 1.
11Proof. From proposition 4 (ii) and proposition 5, (a) and (b) follow. Suppose
the condition under part (c) holds, from proposition 4 (ii) we obtain ˆ x ≥ xt ≥ ˇ x
for all t ≥ 1. Proposition 5 establishes the result.
For the consumption dependent time preference, Tohme and Larrosa (2007)
have also studied the eﬀects of strategic interaction by letting production func-
tion be concave and a priori assuming twice diﬀerentiability of value function.
Instead, we characterize the equilibria by employing the tools provided by lattice
theory and supermodular games.
Under various sources of endogeneity in the discount rate, it has been shown
that optimal growth models have globally monotone capital sequences and that
low levels of initial capital leads to a poverty trap (see Mantel, 1998; Stern,
2006; Le Van et. al., 2009). We obtain that under strategic interaction, non-
monotonic capital sequence is also possible since while one agent accumulates,
the other may deaccumulate capital stock at the ﬁrst period of the game. Af-
ter the ﬁrst period, they both either accumulate or deaccumulate through the
entire duration of the game and equilibrium dynamics are characterized by the
monotonicity of capital stock. Hence, interaction between the rich and the poor
may help the poor avoid poverty traps. Moreover, since we provide all of the
results while abstracting from the curvature of the technology, the poor can the-
oretically push the rich to her lower steady state even under convex technology.
3.4 Concluding Remarks:
In this paper, we study a strategic growth model with two agents under open
loop strategies. By employing the tools provided by lattice theory and super-
modular games, we characterize the equilibria.
Our results diﬀer from corresponding optimal growth model in several ways.
We show that under strategic interaction, non-monotonic capital sequence may
also be obtained. We also conclude that the rich can help the poor avoid poverty
traps whereas the poor may push the rich to her lower steady state even under
convex technology.
As a natural extension of our model, feedback strategies with time dependent
share θi
t can be considered and the game can be solved for Markov perfect
equilibria. It should be emphasized that the tools utilized here can be extended
to other models that incorporate the supermodular game structure.
4 Appendix
4.1 Proof of Proposition 1
(i) Following from the existence of a maximum of xj and a sustainable capital
stock for i, It can be observed that there exists A(xi
0,xj) < ∞ such that 0 ≤
xi
t ≤ A(xi
0,xj) ∀t . With this bound and Tychonov theorem, [0,A(xi
0,xj)]∞ is a




as the set of feasible sequences
from xi
0 for xj, which is closed subset of [0,A(xi
0,xj)]∞, hence compact. Ui is






12βm < 1. Moreover, Ui is continuous followed from continuity of ui,f,β and the
bound βm < 1.It is now clear that the initial problem of agent i is equivalent to
max{Ui  
xi,xj









is compact for the product topology deﬁned on the space of sequences
xi and Ui is continuous for this product topology. Hence, an optimal path







(ii) First, we will prove that xi
t > 0, ∀t. Assume the contrary. Take the
smallest t such that xi
t = 0 and call it n. Since xi
0 > 0, we have xi
n−1 > 0 for
any value of n. Consider xi0such that xi0
n = ε for a suﬃciently small ε, and
xi
t = xi0










































Recall that β : R+ → R++, β(0) > 0. Therefore, from Inada Condition, for suf-




> 0, which contradicts the optimality
of xi. Hence, xi
t > 0, ∀t.
Now, we will prove that ci
t > 0,∀t. Assume the contrary. Clearly zero con-
sumption path after some period can never be optimal, because xi
t > 0, ∀t,
and positive capital will be accumulating forever with zero utility. Hence, there
exists n such that ci
n−1 = 0, ci
n > 0. Consider xi0such that xi0
n = xi
n − ε,
for a suﬃciently small ε, and xi
t = xi0









n and ε < xi



















































From Inada condition, along with assumptions on u, f, β, for suﬃciently small
ε, above expression becomes positive, leading to a contradiction.
























j) is a sublattice of R2. Payoﬀ function of agent i, P(x
i| x
j)(yi),
is supermodular in yi on S(x
i|x
j) for each yj in S(x
j|x
i) follows from the fact
13that S(x
i| x
j) is a chain. Thus showing P(x
i| x









j) will conclude our proof.




























has increasing diﬀerences in
 
yi,yj
for any initial capital. We will show that















has increasing diﬀerences in
 
yi,yj
for any given level of the initial capital
stock.













joint strategies. Since increasing diferences and supermodularity is the same
notion on direct product of ﬁnite collection of chains, sum of supermodular








is supermodular will be suﬃcient for our pur-






























ˆ yi | xj
,
where xj and ˆ x
j diﬀer only in yj and ˆ yj. This follows from the induction hy-
pothesis and the fact that β(·) is increasing in yi. By means of the boundedness
assumption on β(·), one can easily show that Bellman operator is a contraction
mapping so that V i
n → V. Since supermodularity is preserved under pointwise
convergence, V is supermodular.
4.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Set S(x
i,x
j) of feasible joint strategies is nonempty and compact and the payoﬀ
function P(x
i| x
j)(yi) is upper semicontinuous in yi on S(x
i| x
j) for each yj in
S(x
j| x
i) and i. Results follow from Theorem 1.
4.4 Proof of Proposition 4






on X. In order to utilize Theorem 2, it is suﬃcient to show
that the payoﬀ function P(x
i| x








Let us ﬁrst show that P(x
i| x
j)(yi) has (strictly) increasing diﬀerences in


































ˆ yi | xj
.














follows from the strict concavity of u. Accordingly, the fact that P(x
i| x
j)(yi)
has (strictly) increasing diﬀerences in (yi,xj) while keeping ˜ xi constant can be
shown in the same way.







j) : i ∈ N}) is a collection supermodular games parameterized
by x in ˆ X. S(x) is increasing in x on ˆ X follows from strictly increasing f and
P(x| x
j)(yi) has increasing diﬀerences in (yi,x) follows from the strict concavity
of u. Then the result follows from Theorem 2.
4.5 Diﬀerentiability of Value Function
We will show the diﬀerentiability of value function at three steps. First we will
provide a monotonicity result for the best response correspondance of an agent.
Then we will prove that left and right derivatives of value functions is exist. By
using these results, ﬁnally we will show that value function is diﬀerentiable at
almost everywhere.
Step 1:
The following proposition, stating that the best response correspondance
of an agent is increasing in its initial capital, will be crucial in proving the
diﬀerentiability of value function.
Proposition 8 Best response correspondance µi(xi | xj) is increasing in xi for
any given yjon S(x
j| x
i).
Proof. For any given xj where yj ∈ xj, problem of agent i corresponds to single













is a subset of X for each xi ∈ T. S(x
i|x
j)is increasing in xi on
T. P(x
i|x
j) is supermodular in yi on S(x
i|x
j) for each xi follows from the fact
that S(x
i| x
j) is a chain. Moreover we’ve already shown P(x
i| x
j)(yi) has srictly
increasing diﬀerences in (yi,xi). The result then follows from Theorem 3.
Step 2:
Next lemma proves the existence of left and right derivatives of V i. We will
denote the left and right derivatives of V i at a point xi by V i0(xi
− | xj) and
V i0(xi
+ | xj), respectively, and the left and right limits of µ(xi | xj) at a point
xi by µ(xi
− | xj) and µ(xi
+ | xj), respectively.










)θf0(xi + xj) ≤
u0(θf(xi + xj) − µi
 
xi | xj




















15Proof. For a suﬃciently small α > 0, µi
 
xi + α | xj




≤ θf(xi+α+xj) follow from the facts that optimal investment will

















θf(xi + xj) − µi
 
xi + α | xj
+ β[µi
 
xi + α | xj
]V (µi
 




xi + α | xj
= u

θf(xi + α + xj) − µi
 
xi + α | xj
+ β[µi
 
xi + α | xj
]V (µi
 














By using the two inequalities above and replacing µi with µi, we obtain:
u











xi + α | xj





θf(xi + α + xj) − µi
 
xi + α | xj
− u

θf(xi + xj) − µi
 
xi + α | xj
.





xi + α | xj





where h(xi) = θf(xi + xj) − µi
 
xi | xj
. Since µ is right continuous, µ(xi |
xj) = µ(xi
+ | xj). Hence, we have:
V 0i(xi
+ | xj)= u0(h(xi))θf0(xi + xj) = u0(h(x+
i))θf0(xi + xj).
If we write V i(xi | xj), V i(xi −α | xj) and repeat the same manipulations with
µ, we get V 0i(xi
− | xj)= u0(h(xi))θf0(xi + xj) = u0(h(xi
−))θf0(xi + xj). Since
h(xi) ≥ h(xi) and u is a concave function,
V 0i(xi− | xj) = u0(h(xi))θf0(xi + xj) ≤ u0(h(xi))θf0(xi + xj) = V 0i(xi+ | xj)
concludes the proof.
Step 3:
Lemma 1 V i is diﬀerentiable almost everywhere with




where µi(xi | xj) is the best response correspondance of agent i.
Proof. Since the best response functions, µ(xi | xj) andµ(xi | xj) are increas-
ing, they are continuous almost everywhere. We will prove that the set of points
xi > 0 where µ is continuous equals to the set of points where µ is continous.
16Moreover, these best response functions coincide on this set. First, let k > 0 be
a point where µ is continuous. Let ˇ xi
n < xi, ˆ xi
n > xi ∀ n where ˇ xi
n → xi and
ˆ xi
n → xi. We have,
µ(ˇ xi
n | xj) < µ(ˇ xi
n | xj) < µ(xi | xj) < µ(ˆ xi






n | xj) = lim
ˆ xi
n→xi µ(ˆ xi
n | xj) = µ(xi | xj).
Since we have:
µ(ˇ xi
n | xj) < µ(xi
n | xj) < µ(ˆ xi
n | xj),
the function µ(xi | xj) is continuous at xi and µ(xi | xj) = µ(xi | xj). Similarly,
we prove that µ(xi | xj) is continuous where µ(xi | xj) is continuous and at this
point µ(xi | xj) = µ(xi | xj). Hence, we can conclude that the best response
correspondance µ(xi | xj) is single valued almost everywhere, or equivalently,
the value function is diﬀerentiable almost everywhere.
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